We de ne and study a high-level language for describing actions, more expressive than the action language A introduced by Gelfond and Lifschitz. The new language, AR, allows us to describe actions with indirect e ects (rami cations), nondeterministic actions, and actions that may be impossible to execute. It has symbols for nonpropositional uents and for the uents that are exempt from the commonsense law of inertia. Temporal projection problems speci ed using the language AR can be represented as nested abnormality theories based on the situation calculus.
Introduction
Mary jumped into the lake, then got out of the water and put her hat on.
Common sense allows us to answer some questions about the outcome of this series of events.
Is Mary in the lake? Of course not. She just got out of it.
(W ). In A, it can be described by the proposition J causes W:
We would prefer, however, to treat the e ect of J on W as a rami cation of its e ect on L. Any action that causes L to become true will make W true also: if Mary walks into the lake, or crawls into the lake, or is thrown into the lake by her boyfriend, she will get wet all the same. This relationship between L and W can be described in the new action language by writing always L W: 2. Actions described in AR can be nondeterministic. If Mary jumps into the lake while having her hat on (H) then maybe she will lose her hat, or maybe not. In AR, this indeterminacy can be described by the proposition J possibly changes H if H: 3. In AR, an action can be impossible to execute in some states. For instance, Mary cannot get out of the lake if she is already on the shore. We will write this as impossible G if :L:
In fact, this will be treated as an abbreviation for the proposition G causes False if :L: 4 . The language AR has symbols for nonpropositional uents. Generally, a \ uent" 24] is something that depends on the state of the world. For instance, L (being in the lake), W (being wet) and H (having the hat on) are uents, because each can be false or true depending on the particular situation. The possible values of these uents are the truth values of propositional logic, F and T. In a more elaborate formalization, we might wish to introduce the nonpropositional uent symbol Location, representing Mary's current location. AR allows us to write Location is Lake instead of L, and to use other location symbols, such as Shore, Home or
Library, in place of Lake. 5 . In AR, a uent can be classi ed as noninertial, which makes it exempt from the commonsense law of inertia. For instance, the sun may be now behind the clouds (C), but there is no guarantee that this will be still the case a minute later, no matter what Mary will be doing during this time.
The uent C is noninertial. Noninertial uents are needed also for expressing explicit de nitions (Section 4.3).
The next two sections of the paper describe the syntax and semantics of AR and relate this language to the action language A from 7] . Our work on the \debugging" of the semantics of AR has involved the veri cation of several properties of the language that can be naturally expected to hold for action languages; these properties are discussed in Section 4. In Section 5, we de ne the syntax and semantics of \initial conditions" and of \value propositions." This allows us to express formally temporal projection problems involving actions described in AR. In Section 6 we show how temporal projection problems of this kind can be expressed in terms of the version of circumscription 22] called nested abnormality theories 18] . Reductions of this kind are of special interest in connection with recent advances in the automation of circumscriptive reasoning 6], 3]. The relation of this paper to earlier work on action is discussed in Section 7. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Preliminary reports on this work are published as 14] and 8]. AR differs from the language AR 0 described in the rst of these papers in two ways. First, AR 0 did not include symbols for nonpropositional uents (see the end of Section 4.4). Second, instead of possibly changes, it used the construct releases, whose semantics turned out to be less satisfactory (see Section 4.1). Furthermore, this paper di ers from both preliminary publications in that \value propositions" are not treated here as part of AR, and their use is restricted to the conceptually simpler case of temporal projection problems.
Syntax
To be precise, AR is not a single language, but rather a family of languages.
A particular language in this group is characterized by a nonempty set of symbols that are called uent names, a function, associating with every uent name F a nonempty set Rng F of symbols that is called the range of F, a subset of uent names that are called inertial, a nonempty set of symbols that are called action names.
Formulas, Propositions and Action Descriptions
An atomic formula is an expression of the form (F is V ) where F is a uent name, and V 2 Rng F . A formula is a propositional combination of atomic formulas.
There are three types of propositions in AR|constraints, determinate e ect propositions, and indeterminate e ect propositions. A constraint is an expression of the form always C (1) where C is a formula. A determinate e ect proposition is an expression of the form A causes C if P (2) where A is an action name, and C, P are formulas. An indeterminate e ect proposition is an expression of the form A possibly changes F if P (3) where A is an action name, F an inertial uent name, and P a formula (\precondition").
An action description is a set of propositions.
Notational Conventions
In formulas, we will omit some parentheses, as customary in classical logic.
We will denote some xed tautological formula by True, and :True by False.
A determinate e ect proposition (2) will be written as 
States
A valuation is a function that is de ned on the set of uent names and maps each uent name F to an element of its range. A valuation can be extended to atomic formulas in a standard way:
It can be further extended to arbitrary formulas according to the truth tables of propositional logic. A valuation satis es a formula C, or a constraint
A state for an action description D is a valuation that satisfes all constraints in D.
For instance, the states for description (4) 
Example
As an illustration, consider the transition function for example (4 otherwise.
The transition function Res is graphically represented by Figure 1 . Let us go back now to the scenario described in the introduction: Mary jumped into the lake (J), then got out of the water (G) and put her hat on (P ). The examples of commonsense conclusions given there can be interpreted as assertions about paths in the transition diagram. Consider any path of length 3 whose arcs are labeled J; G; P, and let be the end node of this path. Mary is not in the lake: (L) = F. Mary has her hat on:
(H) = T. Mary is wet: (W ) = T.
Simple Descriptions
There is a special case when the de nition of the transition function can be simpli ed. 
The Mathematics of Action Descriptions
The mathematical properties of AR established in this section are not surprising|one would expect them to hold for any action language of this kind. The veri cation of these properties was, however, an important element of our work on the design of the language, because it has allowed us to catch a few nontrivial oversights in earlier versions.
Replacement
Mary has a little lamb, and the lamb always follows Mary wherever she goes.
In AR, this can be expressed by the constraints always Location(Mary) is X Location(Lamb) is X for all symbols X in the range (assumed to be common) of the uent names Location(Mary) and Location(Lamb).
In an action description that includes these constraints, the two uent names are interchangeable: replacing Location(Mary), in one or many occurrences, by Location(Lamb) would not a ect the meaning of the description.
To state this replacement principle in a general form, we need the following de nition. Fluent names F, F 0 are equivalent with respect to a set S of constraints if they are either both inertial or both noninertial, they have a common range, for every valuation that satis es all constraints in S, (F ) = (F 0 ). Consider, for instance, the expression :L in (4), which stands for the formula :(L is T). Theorem 3, with S = ;, shows that the meaning of (4) will not change if we replace this formula by L, which stands for (L is F).
Constraints
Constraints play a double role in the semantics of AR. First, they tell us which valuations are counted as states. Second, they are taken into account in calculating the indirect e ects of actions. In this second function, a constraint can be replaced by a set of determinate e ect propositions: Theorem 4. Let S be a set of constraints, and let S 0 be the set of determinate e ect propositions A causes C for all constraints always C in S and all action names A. The transition diagram for the description S D is a part of the transition diagram for the new description S 0 D: the former can be obtained from the latter by removing the nodes that violate the constraints in S and the arcs that begin in these nodes.
Explicit De nitions
Mary is ready to go back home when she is not wet and has her hat on. We would like to introduce an abbreviation for this propositional combination of uents, :W^H. To this end, extend description (4) by adding the propositional noninertial uent name R to its language and by including in it the \explicit de nition" of R: always R (:W^H):
We chose to declare the new name R noninertial because we expect the e ect of any action on R to be determined by its e ects on W and H and by the de nition of R, not by inertia.
The theorem stated below shows that adding an explicit de nition to an action description leaves its semantics essentially unchanged.
A constraint in an action description D is an explicit de nition of a propositional uent name F if it has the form always F C It is essential for the validity of this theorem that F is required to be noninertial. Without noninertial uent names, we would not be able to express explicit de nitions in the language.
Nonpropositional Fluents
The next result shows that a nonpropositional uent name with a nite range can be eliminated in favor of propositional uent names. A uent with n possible values can be replaced by n propositional uents; constraints included in the new description will require that exactly one of these uents be true in any state.
Let D be an action description, and let F be a set of uent names in the language of D such that every uent name in F has a nite range. The action description D F is de ned as follows. In this sense, nonpropositional uents with nite ranges are redundant. Any action description that involves only uents with nite ranges can be e ectively reduced to a description that involves propositional uents only.
As an example, consider a disk divided into n sectors (n > 1) and an action which rotates the disk by 1=n of a full turn. One way to describe the system is to use the uent name Orientation whose range consists of n symbols 0; : : : ; n ? 1. The e ect of the action Turn can be described by the 
Temporal Projection
As observed at the end of Section 3.3, some commonsense conclusions about the e ects of actions described in AR can be viewed as assertions about paths in the corresponding transition diagram. In this section we introduce a \query language" that can be used, in conjunction with AR, to describe properties of such paths. Let us go back to the lake example. Even if nothing is known about the current state of a airs, we can predict that, should Mary jump into the lake, get out of the water and then put her hat on, she will be not in the lake but still wet, and she will have her hat on. This is an example of \temporal projection," that is, predicting the future on the basis of what is known about the e ects of actions. Symbolically, this conclusion will be expressed in the query language de ned below as follows:
:L^W^H after J; G; P: (8) A temporal projection problem may include, in addition to an action description, some assumptions about the initial state of the world. In the lake example, if we know that initially L^H |Mary is in the lake and has her hat on right now|then we can predict that, should she return to the shore, her hat will be still on her head: H after G: (9) As in Section 2, consider a set of uent names with their ranges, some of them designated as inertial, and a set of action names. An initial condition is an expression of the form initially C (10) where C is a formula. A value proposition is an expression of the form C after A 1 ; : : : ; A n (11) where C is a formula and A 1 ; : : : ; A n (n > 0) are action names. Value propositions are conditions on the values that uents would have should a certain sequence of actions be executed.
A domain description is the union of an action description and a set of initial conditions. We will de ne when a value proposition is a \consequence" of a given domain description.
First For example, (8) is a consequence of action description (4), and (9) is a consequence of the domain description obtained from (4) by adding the initial condition initially L^H: (13) Note that by asserting that (11) is a consequence of a certain domain description we do not claim that the actions A 1 ; : : : ; A n can be executed.
On the contrary, in the case when this string of actions is not executable, the consequence relation trivially holds. For instance, if instead of (13) we add to (4) the initial condition initially H or even initially :L^H; value proposition (9) will still be a consequence.
The consequence relation de ned above is nonmonotonic, because some consequences of D I can be lost when a proposition is added to D. Adding an initial condition, however, can only make the set of consequences bigger. This fact is a restricted monotonicity property in the sense of 16].
Temporal Projection Problems as Abnormality Theories
In this section, we assume that the underlying language has nitely many uent names, each with a nite range, and nitely many action names. We restrict attention to nite action descriptions in this language. An arbitrary temporal projection problem associated with such a description is encoded here, in a simple and modular fashion, as a problem of reasoning in a nested abnormality theory 18] based on the situation calculus.
The abnormality theory corresponding to a given nite action description D and a set I of initial conditions will be denoted by NAT(D; I).
The Language of NAT(D; I )
The language of the theory is many-sorted, with the following sorts: 1. Actions. The universe of actions will be in a one-to-one correspondence with the set of action names of D.
2. Values. The universe of values will be in a one-to-one correspondence with the union of the ranges of the uent names of D.
3. Situations. Intuitively, a situation \is the complete state of the universe at an instant of time" 24]. The universe of situations will include also an auxiliary object which stands for \unde ned." It will help us represent actions that are not always executable. 4. Aspects. As in 22], aspects will be used to distinguish between di erent kinds of abnormality.
The variables of the rst three sorts will be denoted by a; a 1 ; a 2 ; : : :, v; v 1 ; v 2 ; : : : and s; s 1 ; s 2 ; : : :.
The language includes the following object constants: every action name of D is an action constant, every element of the union of the ranges of the uent names of D is a value constant, S 0 (for the initial situation) and ? (\unde ned") are situation constants, for every inertial uent name F of D, e F is an aspect constant.
Finally, the language includes the following function and predicate constants:
Result represents a function that maps an action and a situation to a situation, every uent name F of D represents a function that maps a situation to a value, for every uent name F of D, F R represents the function that is explicitly de ned by the formula F R (a; s) = F(Result(a; s)); (14) Poss represents the predicate that is explicitly de ned by the formula Poss(a; s) Result(a; s) 6 = ?: (15) Note that formulas in the sense of AR (Section 2.1) are not among the formulas of the rst-order language with these nonlogical constants. To avoid confusion, we will refer here to the formulas in the sense of AR as \domain formulas." For any domain formula C and any situation term t, by C(t) we denote the formula obtained from C as the result of replacing each atomic part F is V by F(t) = V . For instance, (:(Orientation is 2))(S 0 ) stands for Orientation(S 0 ) 6 = 2:
For any domain formula C, and action term t 1 and any situation term t 2 , by C R (t 1 ; t 2 ) we denote the formula obtained from C as the result of replacing each atomic part F is V by F R (t 1 ; t 2 ) = V .
The Axioms of NAT(D; I )
The commonsense law of intertia will be expressed in NAT(D; I) by the formulas Poss(a; s)^v = F R (a; s)^:Ab( e F ; v; a; s) v = F(s)
for all inertial uent names F (\normally, if v is the value of F after executing an action then v equals the value that F had previously"). We will denote the list of these formulas by LI .
The formulas expressing the e ect propositions from D are de ned as follows. If Q is a determinate e ect proposition (2) for every proposition initially C in I.
Group 5 is, of course, the main part of the theory. The inner block tells us that an action can be executed unless this is prohibited by the determinate e ect propositions and constraints of D. The outer circumscription encodes the idea of inertia. The nesting of blocks re ects our intention to decide rst which actions can be executed, and then what the e ects of these actions are.
The Soundness and Completeness Theorem
To express value propositions in the language of the situation calculus, we The following theorem expresses the soundness and completeness of the translation described above. 
Related Work
Early attempts to describe properties of actions in classical logic have led to the discovery of the frame problem|the problem of specifying which facts do not change when an action is performed. The assumption that \if a person has a telephone, he still has it after looking up a number in the telephone book" 24] is an example. Methods have been developed for expressing such \frame axioms" in a systematic and compact way 29], 26], 5].
An alternative approach to the frame problem is to formalize, once and for all, the commonsense law of inertia, which, in combination with any set of domain-speci c e ect axioms, would lead to exactly the same conclusions as the appropriate set of frame axioms. This idea was among the rst examples of default reasoning that motivated the development of nonmonotonic logics, including circumscription. However, the rst circumscriptive solution to the frame problem 22] turned out to be unsatisfactory 10]. Among the formalizations proposed in response to this criticism, 1] was particularly in uential, because it could handle actions with indirect e ects; see 12] on its limitations. A survey of nonmonotonic solutions to the frame problem can be found in 28]. It can be argued that the di erence between the two kinds of theories of action|\classical" and \nonmonotonic"|is not as signi cant as commonly thought ( 18] , Section 5.3).
In research on action, it turned out to be di cult to discuss the possibilities and limitations of the available methods in a precise and general way. For a long time, the tradition was to explain every new approach with reference to a few standard examples, such as the blocks world or the shooting scenario from 10]. Competing approaches used to be evaluated and compared mostly in terms of their ability to handle these examples and their enhancements. Such analysis does not say much about the range of applicability of each method. More recently, several researchers attempted to overcome this problem and to discuss representing action in a methodical and theoretically sound way. Three approaches to the systematic study of actions that are being pursued today most actively are associated with the ideas of a causal theory 20], of a dynamical system 27], and of an action 
Let W be the set of the uent names F such that D includes an indeterminate e ect proposition A possibly changes F if P (19) for which satis es P. (20) and consequently F = F 0 and V = 0 (F 0 ). Moreover, equality (20) implies that F 0 2 W 0 and F 2 W. From the last condition we see that F is 0 (F ) belongs to the left-hand side of (17) . Consequently, it belongs to the righthand side also, so that 0 (F ) = 00 (F ). Since both 0 and 00 satisfy S, 0 (F ) = 0 (F 0 ) and 00 (F ) = 00 (F 0 ). Thus V = 0 (F 0 ) = 0 (F ) = 00 (F ) = 00 (F 0 ):
Since F 0 2 W 0 , it follows that the formula F is V is in New A S D 0 ( ; 00 ).
The proof in the other direction, from (18) to (17) 
Assume (21), and take any formula in New A D F ( F ; 0 F ). If this formula is F is V for some F = 2 F then it belongs to the left-hand side of (21), and consequently to the right-hand side too, which implies that it belongs to the right-hand side of (22) . Otherwise, this formula has the form F V is 0
for some F 2 F. Case 1: F V is inertial and 0 F (F V ) 6 = F (F V ). Then F is inertial and 0 (F ) 6 = (F ), so that F is 0 (F ) belongs to the the lefthand side of (21) . Consequently, it belongs to the right-hand side also, which implies that 00 (F ) = 0 (F ). Then 00 F (F V ) = 0 F (F V ), so that F V is 0 F (F V ) belongs to the right-hand side of (22) . Case 2: for some indeterminate e ect proposition (3) in D, F satis es P F . Then satis es P, and we can again use (21) to conclude that 00 (F ) = 0 (F ) and that F V is 0 F (F V ) belongs to the right-hand side of (22) . Now assume (22) , and take any formula F is 0 (F ) in New A D ( ; 0 ). If F = 2 F then it belongs to the left-hand side of (22) , and consequently to the right-hand side too, which implies that it belongs to the right-hand side of (21) . Assume that F 2 F. Case 1: F is inertial and 0 (F ) 6 = (F ). Hence 00 (F ) = 0 (F ), so that F is 0 (F ) belongs to the right-hand side of (21). Case 2: for some indeterminate e ect proposition (3) in D, satis es P. Then F satis es P F , and we can again use (22) A causes (F is c(F)) if P (24) in S c such that satis es P, and the corresponding proposition A causes (F is 0 (F )) if P (25) 
Assume that such a 00 exists. We want to use (26) to simplify both parts of this inclusion. To this end, we need to prove that 00 belongs to the left-hand side of (28) , and consequently to the right-hand side also. It follows that 00 (F ) = 0 (F ), so that 00 satis es F is 0 (F ). We (29) to the function Res. The statement of the lemma uses the following notation. For any valuation , stands for the conjunction of all domain formulas of the form F is (F ). By we denote the set of pairs hA; i such that Res(A; ) = ;. Note that, in this de nition, the set Res(A; ) can be equivalently replaced by its superset Res 0 (A; ), because, for a nite action description, the former cannot be empty unless the latter is empty also. 
